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ABSTRACT 
Current approaches of  phishing filters depend on classifying messages based 
on textually discernable features such as IP-based URLs or domain names as 
those features that can be easily extracted from a given phishing message. 
However, in the same sense, those easily perceptible features can be easily 
manipulated by sophisticated phishers. Therefore, it is important that universal 
patterns of phishing messages should be identified for feature extraction to 
serve as a basis for text classification. In this paper, we demonstrate that user 
perception regarding phishing message can be identified in central and 
peripheral routes of information processing. We also present a method of 
formulating quantitative model that can represent persuasive information 
structure in phishing messages. This paper makes contribution to phishing 
classification research by presenting the idea of universal information structure 
in terms of persuasive communication theories. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In our modern day lives, the internet is a unified window to various sources of 
information for entertainment, study, healthcare, and many other human 
created forms of knowledge products. Emails, as a major method of internet 
communication, serve as a personalized channel of communication for the 
users to experience such knowledge products in various serviceable forms. 
Unfortunately, however, emails are being misused by criminals such that they 
appeal to user’s cognition by engineering urgency, authority, or fear in the 
email message, induce the user’s mindless response, and steal proprietary 
information such as credit card numbers or social security numbers.  Such 
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online crime is referred to as phishing.  
Phishing is online identity theft in which confidential information is obtained 
from victims (Emigh, 2005; Kirda & Kruegel, 2006).  The crime, moreover, is 
spreading fast with the increased share of electronic market place in the retail 
market.  According to the research conducted by Gartner Research Group 
(2005), an estimated 73 million U.S. adults who use the Internet identified that 
they received or thought they received an average of more than 50 phishing e-
mails from June 2004 to May 2005. That number represents a growth rate of 28 
percent compared with the previous 12-month period, during which 57 million 
U.S. adults reported they definitely received or thought they received a phishing 
e-mail.  Phishing scam is a serious problem for many industries since it has a 
great impact on the internet business which is based on the ring of trust between 
vendors and consumers.  It, coupled with increasing disclosure of unauthorized 
access to sensitive consumer data, causes a bad influence on consumer 
confidence in making transactions electronically.  Companies are worried that 
they will lose the ability to leverage low-cost electronic communication channels 
with their customers. 
Phishing attacks are logistically distinct from spam in that 1) phishing attacks are 
more sophisticated, 2) phishing messages are more likely targeted to specific 
audience, 3) phishing attacks are more likely to be short-lived, and 4) phishing 
related web sites are dynamically changing (MessagingAnti-
AbuseWorkingGroup & Anti-phishingWorkingGroup, 2006). Technically, 
therefore, spam filters are not the best solution for phishing filtering.  In other 
words, phishing messages are not easily detected by spam filters since the 
messages tend to emulate the information structure of legitimate emails.  
Consequently, some studies identified phishing specific features and systems 
were designed accordingly.  Some of the phishing specific features are IP-based 
URLs, age of domain names, non-matching URLs, number of links, number of 
domains, number of dots, and use of javascript (Drake, Oliver, & Koontz, 2005; 
Fett, Sadeh, & Tomasic, 2006). However, it can be argued that easily discernable 
features in text, in the same sense, can be easily manipulated by sophisticated 
attackers.  Updating such phishing features for up-to-date design of phishing 
filter can be cumbersome since criminals can use infinite number of ways to 
manipulate email messages.  Therefore, identifying a fundamental and universal 
information structure of phishing messages and designing a set of features for 
such information structure are essential.  The motivation of this study is urged by 
answering the following two fundamental questions in regards to representing 
the information structure of phishing messages:  
1. Why do people keep deceived by phishing scams? 
 
2. What is the universal pattern of phishing message that 
can be applied to different phishing messages?  
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This study finds explanation of phishing victim’s mindless response from dual 
process cognition models.  Instead of arguing that heuristic aspect of cognitive 
process is responsible for user’s mindless response, in this paper, we 
demonstrate that some combinations of dual cognitive processes are related to 
user’s trust decision.  This paper analyzes phishing email messages in the user 
perception level and presents a quantitative model.  First, we classify 
information structure in phishing email messages based on the variables 
measuring components of persuasive transactions.  Then, based on the 
identified persuasive transaction variables representing dual cognition , in 
addition to phishing related variables, we compute a quantitative model that 
can represent the combination of dual cognitive processes while providing the 
binary prediction whether the message is phishing or not.  From the outset, we 
argue that the key to the ultimate solution of phishing scam can be found from 
people, i.e., the users. Since phishing attacks mainly depend on user’s mindless 
response to manipulated email messages (i.e., socially engineered messages), 
the victims play a fundamental role in the crime (Merwe, Loock, & Dabrowski, 
2005).  Therefore, it is important to know how the social engineering is 
deployed and used in phishing emails to trick people and how email users 
perceive manipulated messages and make trust decision.  
The objective of this paper is to present a research framework for phishing 
filter feature extraction.  Although different approaches have been investigated 
to analyze phishing attacks (Adida, Hohenberger, & Rivest, ; Inomata, 
Rahman, Okamoto, & Okamoto, ; Jakobsson, 2005; Parno, Kuo, & Perrig, 
2005), there has not been an attempt to analyze it in user’s perception level.  
This paper provides a framework of a research method in phishing feature 
extraction based on information structure derived from robust communication 
theories. 
This paper describes a pilot analysis with a small sample size.  When a sample 
size is substantially larger, we expect the same method would provide more 
refined results in addition to a richer set of descriptive analysis results.  The 
remaining sections are organized as follows: Section 2 reviews theoretical 
background of this study.  In Section 3, the research procedure and variable 
selection are discussed. In Section 4, we present the statistical procedure for 
verifying dual process cognition model and computing binary prediction 
model.  In Section 5, limitations of the current study and further study 
directions are discussed.  Section 6 concludes our paper. 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In this section, we provide a theoretical background behind our argument that 
message structures in phishing emails can be examined in terms of persuasive 
communication theory.  Although phishing can be conceptually defined as 
manipulation, rather than persuasion, they are not too different when it comes 
to message manipulation tactics and message receiver perception processes.  
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By using the variables measuring persuasive transactions, we can develop a 
quantitative model that represents the structure of persuasive information in 
email messages.  In a practical sense, phishing emails and legitimate emails 
will have different combination and/or contribution of the persuasion variables 
and can be distinguished by the equation containing the set of combination and 
contribution.  
The framework we utilize in this paper is based on persuasive communication 
perspective in two folds; components of persuasive transaction guiding 
compliance gaining message production and a user cognitive model that 
identifies how people would process information in email messages. 
Components of persuasive transactions concern message sender’s message 
manipulation strategies whereas the user cognitive model concern message 
receiver’s information processing model. In summary, message flows of 
phishing communication in our argument can be simplified as follows:  
Sender message manipulation ? Receiver information processing ? Receiver 
trust decision. 
2.1 Sender’s message manipulation 
The art of persuasion has been investigated for several decades since Aristotle 
defined various ways of persuasive appeals such as logos (i.e., rational appeal), 
pathos (i.e., emotional appeal), and ethos (i.e., appeal through knowledgeable 
character).  Until today, source characteristics and message characteristics are 
major components of persuasive communication.  However, since we discuss 
communication by means of computers, persuasive transaction components in 
this paper  are discussed in two broad aspects: Traditional persuasion 
approaches and persuasive technology perspective which are more recent 
research topics in relation to persuasive interface design. 
2.1.1 Source variables and message variables 
Traditionally, message contents are studied as a major factor that influences 
communication outcome.  Hovland et al. (1953), rather than designing a 
formal theory about message learning, started with “assumptions” of how 
people learn verbal and nonverbal skills.  Their assumptions indicate that a 
persuasive communication requires a person’s attention and comprehension 
concerning the information in the message.  After a person attends to the 
message and understands it, s/he establishes a connection between the 
presented issue and those cognitive responses by mentally repeating the 
message arguments.  This repeating may result in storage of information in 
memory in ways that signify the arguments and conclusion.  Although 
attention, comprehension, and retention are necessary preconditions for 
attitude change, Hovland et al. define incentive (i.e., reward) as a sufficient 
precondition.  They, in other words, imply that attitude change can occur 
when major communication stimuli is not directly related to message 
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content.  
Source variables and message variables are mainly discussed in this 
perspective.  Source variables are related to the characteristics of message 
sources in relation to persuasion effectiveness.  Source credibility in terms 
of perceived expertise and trustworthiness is the major concern in the 
discussion of source variables (Hovland et al., 1953; McCroskey, 1966). 
Other kind of traditional variables, discussed in this paper, in relation to 
sender’s message manipulation are message variables.  The message 
variables concern features of messages that are influential in the process of 
persuasive communication.  For example, messages can be rationally 
appealing to message receivers so that they evaluate evidentiary 
information. In other cases, messages can be emotionally appealing so that 
message receivers are influenced by fear or guilt in relation to the message 
content (O'keefe, 1990; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; Stiff & Mongeau, 2003). 
2.1.2 Computer related variables 
More recently, technology factors are also considered as important factors 
influencing communication outcome.  In general, computer interfaces are 
designed for various purposes such as productivity, entertainment, and 
communication.  Thus, usability is one of the core factors of interface 
design principles.  It focuses on functionality of the interface so that users 
can complete information transaction without much difficulty if they desire.  
However, usability is not necessarily a sufficient condition for users to 
actually make transactions.  To be successful in fulfilling the goal of 
making users actually involved in the transaction, the interface design 
should reflect persuasive factors which stimulate user's motivation.  Current 
research on persuasive interface design investigates human components in 
the computer interface which give the users illusory perception as if they 
were interacting with human being (Fogg, 2003; Reeves & Nass, 1996).  
According to the functional triad (Fogg, 2003), computers can play various 
roles in conveying persuasive influence to the users.  First, computer as a 
tool aids the users in making target behavior easier.  For example, one click 
shopping in some online retail store can appeal to buyers by reducing 
various steps of activities to a few simple steps.  In addition, computer as 
media can appeal to users by offering vicarious experience.  Users can be 
motivated by experiencing simulated environment by computers.  Lastly, 
computers can influence users by interaction with them as if humans do, 
namely, social actors. 
2.2 Receiver’s information processing 
The user cognition model in our interest is a dual process of cognition.  
Dual process models of cognition claim that a person's mode of thinking 
determines influence on processing of information.  The models share 
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assumptions about general ideas: 1) there are two relatively distinct modes 
of cognitive processing that a person takes, 2) situational and personal 
variables affect choice of mode, 3) effects are different depending upon the 
mode of process, and 4) influence achieved through receiver’s cognitive 
effort is more persistent over time, more resistant to change, and more 
predictive of behavior than the heuristic processing mode ("Dual process 
persuasion," n.d.).  
For the analysis in this paper, we choose Elaboration Likelihood Model 
(ELM) since it is widely applied to various applications.  The ELM is based 
on the idea that attitudes guide decision-making and its following behavior.  
The model, therefore, concerns the process to reach the attitude change and 
how source, message, receiver, and channel factors affect the mechanism of 
message receiver’s cognitive effort in information processing.  Petty and 
Cacioppo (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981) identify that there are two distinctive 
routes to the information processing which represent the receiver’s 
engagement with various degree of cognitive effort, i.e., central route and 
peripheral route.  The central route concerns the information that a person 
has regarding an object or an issue.  Some of the main factors that the 
central route focuses are: 1) how the arguments are learned, 2) what kind of 
information people create, and 3) how people combine new information 
with prior knowledge.  The information processing in this route appears to 
be rational.  Therefore, the message recipient attends to the message 
arguments and  attempts to scrutinize in order to evaluate them.  In contrast, 
the peripheral route reflects a very different notion of information 
processing.  Attitude change is determined by: 1) rewards or punishments 
that are associated with the message, 2) simple inferential cues, and 3) 
judgmental errors that occur in perceiving message.  In the peripheral route, 
message perceivers make judgments based on simple cues that source or 
message provide. 
The primary difference between the two routes is whether the perceiver 
engages in active thinking regarding the issue relevant information or not.  
In other words, the central route is taken if a perceiver engages in cognitive 
effort to process the issue relevant information, whereas the peripheral 
route is taken when simple cues are applied with significantly less cognitive 
effort than the central route.  Therefore, the persuasive effects are distinct 
depending on the two routes: influence achieved through receiver’s 
cognitive effort is more persistent over time, more resistant to change, and 
more predictive of behavior than peripheral processing route.  In general, 
however, the peripheral route deems to produce persuasive outcome more 
easily because people tend to make quick decisions based on peripheral 
cues. 
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2.3 Research questions 
Based on the previous discussion on persuasive transactions and dual process 
of cognition, we state the following two research questions: 
 
(1) Would the persuasive information structure in phishing message be 
perceived in two distinct routes by the email recipients? 
 
(2) Would the persuasive information structure in phishing message 
serve as good features for classifying phishing message from legitimate 
message? 
 
Designing a research study and testing collected data for the aforementioned 
research questions involves two statistical analyses, i.e., factor analysis and 
logistic regression analysis.  Factor analysis identifies underlying dimensions 
among a set of variables.  Therefore, in order to test the dual process 
information processing, stated in the research question (1), we conduct a factor 
analysis. In addition, logistic regression analysis is used for categorization and 
prediction. For designing of potential formula for classifying email messages, 
required for answering research question (2), binomial logistic regression is 
used.  
3. METHOD 
In this section, we present the procedures and measures that are used in our 
analyses. Sampling procedure, sample selection, content analysis procedure, 
and measurements are discussed.  Our main method consists of four steps; 1) 
feature construction, 2) content analysis, 3) factor analysis, and 4) logistic 
regression analysis. Figure 1 illustrates procedures of our methodological 
approach. 
3.1 Sample Collection 
Phishing emails were collected by email feeds from antiphishing.org.  Email 
feeds are received through info620@gmail.com which was set up particularly 
for this project.  The feeding began from Aug 16, 2006 adding thousands of 
feedings per day.  Since the email feedings of antiphishing.org are provided by 
members who are not necessarily well aware of the definition of phishing, 
some feedings were not phishing emails.  Among the provided feedings, 
reasonably identifiable as phishing emails are selected in our sample.  The 
sample for equation generation includes both phishing emails and legitimate 
emails. Legitimate emails are collected from personal email accounts. 
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Figure 1. Methodological approach of our study 
 
 
3.2 Variables and Procedures 
Variables used for our analyses were selected from a series of studies identified 
below.  Source variables, message variables, and computer variables are 
measured in the five point Likert scale anchoring from 1, not likely, to 5, very 
likely.  Phishing variables are coded in a binary form to simply represent the 
existence of the particular feature.  Brief description of each variable is 
illustrated in Table 1, and the selection of variables followed descriptions 
below.  
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? Source variables and message variables are selected from reviewing 
persuasion literature (Hovland et al., 1953; McCroskey, 1966; O'keefe, 
1990; Stiff & Mongeau, 2003). 
? Computer variables are derived from Fogg’s functional triad (Fogg, 
2003).  
? Phishing variables are selected from reviewing phishing related 
literature (Drake et al., 2005; Fett et al., 2006) 
 
Table 1. Description of variables used in analyses 
Kind of Analysis Used Variable 
Components 
Used Variable Item 
Category 
Used Variable Item 
Measurements 
Source variables 
(Continuous) 
Credibility Expertise 
Trustworthiness 
Rational appeals Perceived rationality of 
argument 
Perceived plausibility 
of evidence 
Message variables 
(Continuous) 
Emotional appeals Perceived degree of 
fear  
Tool Easiness of interaction  
Medium Vicarious experience 
Factor 
Analysis 
Computer 
variables 
(Continuous) Social actor Social experience 
Email address 
discrepancy 
Reply address differs 
from the claimed 
sender 
Quick response Requiring a quick 
response 
Collecting info Collecting information 
in the e-mail or links to 
web sites that gather 
information 
Link text discrepancy Link text in e-mail 
differs from link 
destination or hides 
link 
Logistic 
Regression 
 Phishing variables 
(Binary) 
Confusing 
destination address  
Uses @ symbol to 
confuse 
 
For different analysis, different set of data was used.  For factor analysis, five 
different phishing emails were shown to coders.  The messages were evaluated 
by ten coders based on variables associated with persuasive transactions.  
Comrey and Lee (1992) recommend more than 300 cases as decent sample size 
for Factor Analysis.  It is generally understood that observation under 10 can 
cause computational difficulties.  Coders spent approximately two minutes to 
read one email message.  After reading the five emails, coders were asked to 
evaluate their impressions about the phishing emails.  For logistic regression 
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analysis, 16 phishing emails and 8 legitimate emails were used.  The emails 
used from logistic regression analysis were selected from different pool so that 
they do not overlap with the previous five emails shown to the coders. The 
coding materials and coding results were delivered electronically.  The coders 
received instruction, questionnaire, and the emails for analysis through their 
emails and the coding results were also submitted via emails.   
4. ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
In this section, we describe statistical procedures and methods used for our 
analyses.  Analyses of collected data consist of two major procedures.  First, 
factor analysis is used for variable classification.  Variables are classified for 
the validation of a dual process of cognition. From the pool of persuasive 
communication variables, we identify underlying dimension (see Table 2).  
Once the variables are classified, cases are classified by conducting logistic 
regression analysis based on the identified variables as a result of confirmatory 
factor analysis in addition to known phishing factors described in the previous 
section.  The purpose of case classification is to design a quantitative model 
that can make predictions on email messages whether they are phishing or not.  
Known phishing factors are also refined based on close examination.  For 
example, company logo factor is filtered out since both legitimate emails and 
phishing emails use company logos in their messages.  In other words, a 
company logo is not a good predictor of discriminating phishing emails from 
legitimate ones.  Logistic regression analysis offers the proportion of variance 
in the dependent variable accounted for by the predictor variables as well as the 
relative rank of importance of each predictor variable.  
Table 2. Factor Loadings - Rotated Component Matrix 
Rotated Component Matrix(a) 
  Component 
 1 2 3 
Perceived Expertise 0.55 0.50 -0.52 
Perceived rationality of argument 0.42 0.07 0.69 
Perceived plausibility of evidence 0.02 0.09 0.97 
Perceived Trustworthiness 0.42 0.81 0.14 
Emotional Appeal (e.g., fear) 0.44 -0.63 -0.30 
Easiness of interaction 0.16 -0.72 0.07 
Vicarious experience -0.77 0.06 -0.14 
Social experience -0.84 0.04 -0.11 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a Rotation converged in 5 iterations.  
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4.1 Factor Analysis 
Phishing email persuasive message data were examined by a factor analysis 
using Principal Components extraction and Varimax rotation method.  Three 
factors were extracted and rotated. Each factor was apparently interpretable in 
terms of distinct characteristic;  Factor 2 represents “peripheral route of 
information processing” whereas Factor 3 concerns the “central route of 
information processing”.   Factor 1 was identified with variables that have 
relatively high factor loading values. It seems that computer variables are 
separately identified in the user’s information processing scheme of persuasive 
message1.  The three-factor solution accounted for 73.11 percent of total 
variance. 
The sum of squared loading after rotation for Factor 2 and Factor 3 are 1.84 
and 1.83, respectively.  These two factors contribute 45.87% of the total 
variance. Factor 2 was composed of variables indicating user’s peripheral route 
of information processing such as “perceived trustworthiness”, “emotional 
appeal”, and “easiness of interaction”, each reflecting factor loadings of .81, -
.63, and -.72, respectively.  Factor 3 consisted of variables reflecting user’s 
central route of information processing such as “Perceived rationality of 
argument” and “Perceived plausibility of evidence”, each having factor 
loadings of .69, and .97, respectively. The sum of squared loading after rotation 
for the factor 1 is 2.17, consisting of variables reflecting illusory experience 
with computer interface.  The variables were “Vicarious experience” and 
“Social experience” with factor loadings of -.77 and -.84, respectively. Factor 1 
accounted for 27.23 percent of total variance. “Perceived expertise” loaded 
similarly to all factors. 
The above results show that variables are identified under distinct dimensions.  
First, “perceived rationality of argument” and “perceived plausibility of 
evidence” are grouped under a same dimension.  We interpret that this 
dimension represents central route information processing since the variables 
are related to message manipulation that result in more cognitive effort of 
message receivers when processing information.  Second, “perceived 
trustworthiness,” “emotional appeal,” and “easiness of interaction” are grouped 
under a same dimension, representing peripheral route of information 
processing.  We argue that they are related to message manipulation resulting 
in less cognitive involvement when processing main argument of the presented 
message.  “Vicarious experience” and “social experience” are also grouped 
together.  We were not able to provide a proper interpretation of this particular 
dimension in terms of dual process cognition model.  However, we expect that 
variable grouping can be more refined when the sample size is larger. 
                                                 
1 We expect that the pattern would be different with a larger sample size. Current data shows a 
distinction between traditional persuasive transaction and computer persuasive transaction. 
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4.2 Logistic Regression Analysis 
A logistic regression analysis was conducted to examine multivariate 
predictors of phishing discrimination.  Logistic regression can be used to 
predict a dependent variable on the basis of continuous and/or categorical 
predictor variables and to determine the percent of variance in the dependent 
variable explained by the predictors.  Logistic regression is a linear classifier, 
similar to Gaussian Naïve Bayes, that shows function approximation learning 
algorithms as statistical estimators or functions (Mitchell, 2006; Roos, Wettig, 
Grunwald, Myllymaki, & Tirri, 2005).  With this analysis, a regression 
equation is created that can predict whether the email is phishing or not. 
Since phishing variables are theory-driven and we used different dimensions of 
variables together in the analysis, we used a forward stepwise method instead 
of Enter method in SPSS management.  The predictor variables entered for the 
analysis are perceived trustworthiness, perceived rationality of argument, 
perceived plausibility of evidence, emotional appeal, easiness of interaction, 
vicarious experience, social experience, email address discrepancy, quick 
response requirement, collecting personal information or not, link text 
discrepancy, and destination address confusion.  
The result identified that the logistic model (100%) had more effective 
prediction rate than the null model (69.6%).  The logistic model was 
significantly associated with the binary prediction of phishing (χ2 (2) = 28.26, 
p<.0001).  The suggested equation for the logistic model is stated as below;  
 
f (phishing) = 18.07 + (38.39)* Email address discrepancy  
+ (-37.82)* Confusing destination address 
 
Furthermore, the insignificant Hosmer–Lemeshow test (2 (1) = 0, p>.05) 
shows that the null hypothesis of a good model fit to data was acceptable.  In 
other words, the model was a good fit to the data.  Therefore, when the data of 
“Email address discrepancy” and “Confusing destination address” are given we 
can predict whether the email is phishing or not with 100% accuracy. 
However, this analysis resulted from only 23 cases of dataset.  Since optimal 
number of observation should be much larger than 23, this analysis only shows 
methodological approach rather than presenting substantial finding. 
5. DISCUSSION 
In the sections above, statistical analyses of phishing email structure were 
presented. Factor analysis classified variables to verify dual process of 
cognition.  Logistic regression analysis presented a potential classifier model 
that could offer binary prediction.  In this section, first, major limitations of 
this paper are discussed. Although we already identified that this study is for 
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suggesting a research framework, the sample size is an inevitable problem in 
statistical analysis. Potential limitations of theory adoption and measurement 
limitation are also discussed.  
Without an optimal sample size, this study only shows the research framework 
instead of significant research results.  Unfortunately our preliminary analysis 
does not result in an equation that contains persuasive transactional 
components in the predictor variables.  Although the result showed that the 
logistic model would classify phishing with 100 percent accuracy, the equation 
consists of only phishing features.  We expected that the equation would reflect 
components of persuasion variables when the sample size is large enough since 
the main point of our argument is that persuasive information structure should 
work as universal features across different kinds of phishing messages.  
In this paper, we only adopted parts of core components of persuasive 
transactions.  In real life situations, more various principles of persuasion can 
be applied to communications.  For example, receiver involvement is a critical 
component in persuasive communication.  If a message receiver is personally 
involved in the issue presented in the message, it is more likely that the 
message receiver engage in critical evaluation of the presented message.  
However, the receiver factor was ignored in our research design since we only 
looked at sender and message perspectives in that the phishing message was 
analyzed in terms of sender’s message manipulation strategy.  However, 
adoption of persuasive theories may be more refined to consider different 
perspectives of persuasion.  
Measurements used for feature values for this paper was subjective measures 
which represent user perception.  It is a challenging task to represent human 
perception for the tasks of text classification.  System implementation can be 
difficult and/or uneconomical since there should be an additional system which 
should function as a reference to signify the feature set representing persuasive 
component.  
6. CONCLUSION 
Investigating information structure of phishing email can provide system 
designers with a novel idea of phishing detecting mechanism.  In this paper, we 
demonstrated that user perception regarding phishing message can be identified 
in two distinct ways of information processing, i.e., central route and peripheral 
route.  We also identified a quantitative model that represents persuasive 
information structure in email messages.  We claim that the model can be used 
for classifying phishing emails from legitimate emails.  In particular, we 
proposed a method to design a set of features for the classification based on a 
dual process model of cognition.  
The results of this study indicate that persuasive components in phishing 
messages can be identified as a set of features for phishing detection 
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mechanism.  The results are significant in that the identified set of features 
using our method can potentially be used for the design of phishing filter which 
does not required frequent feature update.  The features extracted from our 
method would serve as a universal pattern of phishing email messages.  
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